The 2026 parliamentary election campaign has taken an unexpected turn in Hungary. The election is still a few days away, but the political landscape has already shifted: according to major polling agencies, the opposition Tisza Party holds a clear majority. This is an unexpected turn of events, given that for years many believed Viktor Orbán’s party (Fidesz) had built such a media dominance that it had cemented his hold on power, making him unbeatable in elections.
These development is forcing many experts to acknowledge past mistakes and rethink some long-held assumptions. It seemed that the takeover of public service media, the market-distorting effect of state advertising, the growing role of pro-government investors, and the resulting exceptionally high media ownership concentration made the functioning of a democratic public sphere and genuine political competition impossible. Today we know that small islands of free media have an effect, even if the media system is distorted and political power can control many news sources.
Hungary 2026: the “pardon scandal” and the rise of Péter Magyar
It is worth examining the main elements of the political realignment of the past two years and the role the independent media played in it. The story of the new opposition leader, Péter Magyar, began in February 2024, following the so-called pardon scandal, in which the president granted a pardon to an accomplice of a pedophile. The pardon case was uncovered by an independent news portal, and in the days that followed, other independent media outlets also added important details to the story. The pardon scandal itself facilitated Péter Magyar’s rise to prominence in two ways: on the one hand, the outrage was of elemental force, and Hungarian society displayed a level of political activity not seen in a long time. On the other hand, the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice resigned; the latter was Péter Magyar’s former wife, the mother of their three children, who was also the Fidesz lead candidate in the upcoming European Parliament elections. With his wife’s political career over, the path opened for Péter Magyar, and the day after the resignations, he walked into Partizán, the most popular political YouTube channel. He gave a lengthy interview and revealed information about the ruling party’s corrupt practices that had never before been heard from someone with direct insight into Fidesz’s internal affairs. The interview became the most-watched episode in Partizán’s history, with 2.8 million viewers, and marked the beginning of a new political era.
It is not surprising that pro-government media has been attacking Péter Magyar with smear campaigns from the very beginning; in response, the politician refers to the staff working there exclusively as propagandists and speaks at length about how propaganda works. Far more interesting, however, is Péter Magyar’s ambivalent relationship with the independent media. On the one hand, the politician regularly criticizes the independent press as well, claiming it either covers certain topics too much or too little. On the other hand, he adheres to basic rules of the game, gives interviews, and, in connection with serious investigative pieces, correctly credits the media outlet that conducted the journalistic work. Shortly after entering the political arena, in the spring of 2024, he labelled an outstanding investigative journalist – and indeed, the entire editorial staff – a propagandist; this outlet is, incidentally, one of the country’s most reliable and well-known media outlets. He has learned from this; there have been no such excesses since then, and he clearly avoids sharp conflicts with the independent media.
A highly social leader
However, there are also worrying developments. Tisza’s candidates and politicians are not allowed to give interviews; only Péter Magyar does so. For now, everyone hopes this is merely part of the campaign strategy – protecting his inexperienced candidates from pressure – and not a sign that, should he come to power, he might establish a fully centralized system similar to Fidesz’s. It is also concerning that Magyar clearly views social media as the main arena for communication, which is, of course, understandable given the current situation, yet at the same time he criticizes journalists for not covering the political rallies he holds – sometimes as many as four or five a day in different cities – all of which he broadcasts live on his own social media channels. This could cause a lot of conflict in the future; it seems that Péter Magyar expects journalists to play some kind of subservient, promotional role and has little respect for the media’s own logic.
