Putin’s second front is broader than Eastern Europe

The advent of President Donald Trump’s second presidency in 2025 has created profound geopolitical stress, characterised by the accelerated fraying of the historic transatlantic alliance. For leading non-European players, particularly Russia, this erosion presents a significant opportunity to consolidate and expand their spheres of influence on multiple fronts, beyond Eastern Europe, including the Middle East and Africa.

This systemic shock to transatlantic relations, fueled by Trump’s transactional and often hostile policies towards Europe, is viewed by Moscow as an opportunity to diminish American influence globally in favour of a multipolar world. Russia is actively exploiting European uncertainty and resource drain, as in Ukraine, to advance its own strategic goals. 

Europe’s stance

A key instance of tension arose from Trump’s aggressive foreign and trade policy, exemplified by the “Liberation Day” tariffs announced on April 2, 2025, which threatened a minimum 10% tariff on all trading partners and a 20% tariff on the EU. This change of stance forced the EU to offer concessions, including a 15% baseline tariff, to stabilise commercial relations and avoid a full-scale trade war with a crucial ally. 

A further point of weakness emerges in the military domain, where NATO’s former cohesion is increasingly approached with caution. While allies managed to “buy some time” for NATO at the June 2025 summit by pledging to raise defence spending targets to 5% of GDP by 2035, Washington’s rhetoric has left European members concerned about whether the United States will remain committed to the alliance, more precisely to Article 5. Russia views these changes as a sign of European anxiety and as an opportunity to strengthen its political influence, for instance, in Hungary and Moldova. It is also attempting to gain advantages in the conflict with Ukraine, knowing that sustaining aid to Kyiv and beyond is far more difficult without a more engaged United States. In the meantime, Moscow is regaining ground in the Middle East, after the weakening of Iran and the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

Re-consolidation in Syria

The Middle East remains a critical ground in Moscow’s broader confrontation with the West, as it always has been, providing strategic logistics routes and military bases. With this vision, Russia is rethinking and reconsolidating its military influence in Syria, a year after the Moscow-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown. 

Russian-Syrian defence delegations have been meeting since July 2025, most recently in October 2025 to discuss deepening military and security cooperation. President Putin also hosted Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa for the first time since Assad’s fall, during which al-Sharaa sought to “restore and redefine relations with Moscow”. For Russia, Syria offers a strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean, allowing access to NATO’s southern European flank, the Middle East, and Africa. Regarding cooperation, the talks with interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa focused on access to Russian energy and investment. Moscow appeals to Damascus with “no strings attached” agreements, in contrast to Western democracies that typically condition aid on democratic and human rights reforms. Nevertheless, the EU plans to allocate $5.8 billion in grants, loans, and humanitarian assistance to support Syria’s reconstruction – stepping in at a moment when essential USAID offices and programs, which provided assistance in the region, have been shut down. For the EU, sustaining Syria’s recovery while recalibrating its own policies and partnerships remains a formidable challenge. 

Another key player in the region is Turkey, whose relationship with Moscow is defined by mutual dependence and strategic ambiguity. Ankara sees Russia as a military counterbalance to Israeli and American interests in Syria, while Israel, conversely, views Russia as a buffer against growing Turkish influence in the country; this triangulation places Russia as the pivotal actor between NATO and non-NATO interests in Syria. This situation strongly favours Russia’s interests, enabling it to regain operational control of its Hmeimim and Tartus military bases. Finally, Syria’s energy, infrastructure and logistics sectors present huge opportunities for both Turkey and Russia, considering that reconstruction needs are estimated to amount to nearly $1 trillion.

The long game with “Africa 2063”

Russia is actively pursuing a deep geopolitical and economic expansion also across Africa. This ambitious long-term strategy was detailed at a government-sponsored panel in October 2025, titled “Russia and Africa in 2063”. Moscow aims to establish itself as a dependable partner in key areas, including nuclear energy, security, and infrastructure. Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, has already established agreements with over 20 African countries. Among these, Egypt and Ethiopia stand out with their combined investment of $60 billion for their nuclear reactors. A noteworthy recent development is Niger, a crucial player in Africa’s energy security due to its abundant uranium resources, which has announced plans with Rosatom to build two nuclear reactors. 

East Africa is also emerging as a geopolitical point of contention between the US and Russia. A clear example is Sudan, which signed a comprehensive agreement with Russia to reconstruct its critical transport systems, destroyed by decades of underinvestment and the ongoing civil war. The deal comes after warnings in April 2025 against Russia’s expansion in the region and the concern over plans for its naval base in Port Sudan. Russia’s entry adds a new dimension to the complex reality of the Red Sea, where the UAE has invested $22 billion in Sudan, the US maintains its security bases in Djibouti, and China is involved with its Belt and Road Initiative. The Sudan deal builds on Russia’s broader Africa re-engagement policy visible in Mali, the Central African Republic, and Burkina Faso. Russia has shifted from primarily arms and mining deals to infrastructure, reinforcing its narrative of partnership, as seen in Syria.

In conclusion, Moscow is steadily building a multi-regional presence. While this does not yet constitute a direct challenge to the European Union, Russia is clearly not retreating from Syria, a relationship that both sides will need to redefine. A similar dynamic is unfolding in Sudan, where the initial port agreement signed in 2019 has been revived through the September 2025 deal, continuing the legacy of the former Bashir government. Russia’s strategy in Africa is long-term, and the US is not backing down either. Although the EU’s coordination and action in the Middle East have at times fallen short, when effective, its engagement has been both assertive and pragmatic, as demonstrated in Syria. These efforts must now extend to the Horn of Africa if the EU is to sustain its influence in an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape.

Bibliography

Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2025). Mapping Gulf State Actors’ Expanding Engagements in East Africa. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Available at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gulf-state-actors-east-africa/.

African Security Analysis (2025). Russia–Sudan Comprehensive Agreement: Infrastructure, Finance, and Strategic Expansion in the Horn of Africa | African Security Analysis. African Security Analysis. Available at: https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/russia-sudan-comprehensive-agreement-infrastructure-finance-and-strategic-expansion-in-the-horn-of-africa.

Aktaş, A. (2025). Russia, Syria discuss military facilities, cooperation in oil, energy sectors. Anadolu Agency. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/-russia-syria-discuss-military-facilities-cooperation-in-oil-energy-sectors/3718064.

Al Jazeera (2025). EU, others pledge more than $6bn to Syria in post-al-Assad donor drive. Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/eu-pledges-2-5-billion-euros-2-7bn-to-syria-in-post-al-assad-donor-drive.  

Aratani, L. (2025). Trump set to announce new round of tariffs on his so-called ‘liberation day’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/02/trump-new-tariffs-liberation-day.

Avdaliani, E. (2025). Russia Keeps a Foothold in Post-Assad Syria. Stimson Center. Stimson Center. Available at: https://www.stimson.org/2025/russia-keeps-a-foothold-in-post-assad-syria/.

Bloomberg (2025). Russia Renews Flights to Syrian Air Base in Rebuild of Relations. Bloomberg. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-30/russia-renews-flights-to-syrian-air-base-in-rebuild-of-relations?embedded-checkout=true.

Caselli, F. (2025). Why is Hungary So Close to Russia? Spykman Center. Available at: https://www.spykmancenter.org/why-is-hungary-so-close-to-russia.

El Obeid, S. (2024). Sudan’s War: The Narrow Path to Peace. Fondation Méditerranéenne d’Études Stratégiques. Available at: https://fmes-france.org/sudans-war-the-narrow-path-to-peace/.

Ero, C. (2025). Europe’s Biggest Challenges Lie Ahead. International Crisis Group. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/europes-biggest-challenges-lie-ahead. 

Harward, C. (2025). Russia Continues Efforts to Regain Influence over Moldova. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-continues-efforts-to-regain-influence-over-moldova/.

Kajjo, S. (2025). Russia Returns to Syria—But Did It Ever Leave? Middle East Forum. Available at: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/russia-returns-to-syria-but-did-it-ever-leave. 

Kenn Klomegah, K. (2025). Building Africa’s Nuclear Energy Network: Rosatom’s Expanding Footprint. Modern Diplomacy. Available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/06/20/building-africas-nuclear-energy-network-rosatoms-expanding-footprint/.

Landale, J. (2025). Syria’s Sharaa meets Putin in Moscow for first time since Assad’s fall. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c201p2dd6r4o.

Nan Tian, N., Scarazzato, L. and Guiberteau Ricard, J. (2025). NATO’s new spending target: challenges and risks associated with a political signal. SIPRI. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/natos-new-spending-target-challenges-and-risks-associated-political-signal.

National Centre Russia (2025). ‘Russia and Africa’: experts discussed what relations they will have by 2063. National Centre Russia. Available at: https://future.russia.ru/en/news/rossiia-i-afrika-eksperty-obsudili-kakimi-budut-otnoseniia-k-2063-godu.

Notte, H. (2025). Russia Is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa. War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/russia-is-shrewdly-playing-the-long-game-in-africa/. 

Rosatom (2025). Russian Atoms for Africa. Rosatom. Available at: https://rosatomnewsletter.com/2025/10/28/russian-atoms-for-africa/.

SANA (2025). Defense Minister concludes talks in Moscow on military cooperation. Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). Available at: https://sana.sy/en/politics/2275149/.

Sayigh, Y. (2025). Syria Needs a Reconstruction Plan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2025/10/syria-needs-a-reconstruction-plan?lang=en.

Strategiecs (2025). U.S. Presence in Syria: Changing the Attribute of Participation and Presence. Strategiecs. Available at: https://strategiecs.com/en/analyses/us-presence-in-syria-changing-the-attribute-of-participation-and-presence.