From Strategic Partnership to Ideological Rivalry
The notion of a shared democratic mission across the Atlantic has been replaced by open ideological divergence. The publication of a State Department document in early 2025, explicitly advocating the rise of far-right movements in Europe, made visible a process of instrumentalising ideological polarisation as foreign policy. When senior U.S. officials publicly describe Europe’s centrist and pluralist traditions as “threats to Western civilisation,” they reveal that the U.S. now views European democracies not as partners to reinforce but as models to renovate.
This dynamic is strengthened by political rhetoric that blurs the boundary between domestic populism and foreign policy. The U.S. administration’s vocal support for nationalist leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, and its criticism of EU mechanisms defending judicial independence, illustrate an unprecedented alignment between American executive power and Europe’s own illiberal movements. What was once diplomatic friction has become a proper form of ideological interference.
Europe’s Slow Awakening
For too long, European governments responded with strategic restraint, seeking to preserve cooperation through personal diplomacy and institutional inertia. This attitude reflected the conviction that transatlantic tensions were cyclical rather than structural. However, the ideological gap widens, as the limits of this approach are evident. Appeasement has neither mitigated U.S. hostility nor preserved European leverage. Instead, it has exposed the asymmetry at the heart of the transatlantic relationship.
A shift is now taking place. Across European policy circles, the recognition is spreading that the alliance, as historically conceived, no longer exists or at least, no longer operates in the interest of the European countries. The United States has become a systemic variable to be managed, not a normative reference to emulate. This recognition marks a profound psychological and strategic adjustment for Europe, transforming the premise of its external action from cooperation to autonomy.
Redefining Strategic Autonomy
In practice, this adjustment translates into a gradual reconfiguration of economic, security, and technological dependencies. In economic policy, the European Commission is accelerating efforts to reduce reliance on U.S. capital markets and digital infrastructure. Initiatives to complete the banking union, deepen the Capital Markets Union, and expand trade diversification reflect a broader understanding that economic sovereignty is inseparable from democratic resilience.
In the field of defence, the conversation has moved beyond rhetorical calls for “strategic autonomy.” The decline of trust in Washington’s reliability is pushing member states toward concrete steps, such as shared procurement, integrated command systems, and investment in local defence production. These developments remain uneven and politically contested, but they signal a recognition that Europe’s security architecture must be credible even in the absence of unconditional U.S. commitment.
Energy and technology further reveal Europe’s structural vulnerabilities. Continued dependence on American liquefied natural gas, cloud services, and semiconductor technologies grants Washington significant leverage. Efforts to expand renewable capacity, secure critical supply chains, and protect European technological assets such as ASML from external coercion are essential but remain incomplete. Europe’s ambition to achieve “open strategic autonomy” still confronts the inertia of its fragmented decision-making.
The Democracy Paradox
The most profound dimension of this transformation lies in the sphere of democracy itself. Europe now faces challenges from within and from without: internal democratic backsliding and external pressure from an American administration that openly supports illiberal movements. Mechanisms such as the Article 7 procedure or the rule-of-law conditionality regime have proven only partially effective, constrained by the very pluralism they seek to protect.
The external dimension poses an even more complex dilemma. For the first time since 1945, the United States can no longer be taken for granted as a promoter of democratic governance. European policymakers must therefore consider how to sustain democracy in a context where Washington’s influence may undermine rather than reinforce democratic norms. Supporting independent institutions, countering disinformation, and defending regulatory autonomy against ideological pressure now constitute elements of a defensive democratic strategy directed as much toward transatlantic politics as toward domestic threats.
Paradoxically, this moment of crisis coincides with renewed public support for the European project. Across member states, citizens express growing trust in the EU and its institutions, perceiving them as a safeguard of democratic stability in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. This creates an opportunity, and an obligation, for leaders to translate popular confidence into coherent policy. Failure to do so risks deepening cynicism and empowering precisely the forces that challenge Europe’s democratic fabric.
The Choice Before Europe
Europe now stands at a strategic crossroads. It can maintain the illusion of continuity, preserving short-term cooperation while accepting long-term subordination. Or it can redefine itself as an autonomous political actor capable of defending its interests and values independently of American validation. The first path offers stability at the cost of agency; the second offers sovereignty at the price of uncertainty.
The Trump administration’s orientation leaves little room for ambiguity. Its vision of Europe is one of compliant nationalism, a continent of states aligned with American geopolitical priorities but stripped of collective purpose. Europe’s response must therefore be guided not by nostalgia for the transatlantic past but by clarity about the new international reality. Europe’s task is not to replicate American power but to balance it. That means investing in political unity, institutional capacity and normative confidence. The challenge is immense, but so is the opportunity to reshape Europe not as a junior partner within an American sphere of influence, but as an autonomous centre of democratic legitimacy in a multipolar world.
References:
https://intpolicydigest.org/how-europe-plans-to-survive-trump-s-fragile-ego/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/07/europe-america-trump-democracy-nato/
https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/10/five-pillars-for-europe-in-the-second-trump-era?lang=en
https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar0ec480cc
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/09/opinion/trump-maga-government-future.html
https://ecfr.eu/publication/maga-goes-global-trumps-plan-for-europe/